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Abstract
Productivity comparisons need to be based on a careful definition of the objectives. 
Labour productivity per hour worked is the best measure of prosperity per effort at any
time, but can sometimes be achieved at the expense of unemployment or low capital
productivity.  Total factory productivity is the nearest measure we have to absolute
efficiency, but that does not mean that it is an appropriate policy maximand.  Performance
can, therefore only be compared by looking at several different measures.  Using this
conceptual background to compare American, French, German, and UK productivity, the
author concludes that between the US and continental economies social choices and trade-
offs are the key drivers of observed differences, but that the UK is still behind both the
Continent and the US on absolute efficiency.  The policy choices implied for the UK are
explored.
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Growth, Productivity and Employment
Adair Turner
1. Introduction
My topic is the comparison of productivity figures for the US, continental Europe
(focusing on Germany and France) and the UK, and the links between productivity
levels, growth rates, and levels of employment.  This is of course a well-trodden ground.
It is well-trodden ground in terms of the figure work, and I have certainly not attempted
any new basic research for this paper, drawing my figures entirely from Mary
O’Mahony’s excellent study published by the National Institute for economic and Social
Research1.  And it is well-trodden ground in terms of polemics, with, broadly two schools
of thought:
· A broadly left-of-centre school, which focuses on the supposedly superior
performance of Germany and France and urges us to copy their higher levels
of investment and skills - Will Hutton's “The State We're In” is a classic
statement of that proposition.
· The “ultra liberal” school, which focuses on the supposedly superior
performance of the US - and urges further market liberalisation as the route to
match that superiority. The McKinsey report on productivity presented last
year falls broadly in that camp.
My purpose is to throw some light on that controversy, and I have two essential
messages:
· First, that to throw such light we need to be far more explicit than most
commentators have been about the conceptual framework, about what
different measures mean, which measures we should treat as maximands and
which not, and why.  For polemicists on either side have tended to approach
this issue by highlighting the measure that proves their case, rather than
making plain the fact that there is no single inherent absolute measure of
success.
· Secondly, that the more you look at the issue, the more one is aware of trade-
offs, of the social choices inherent in any debate about productivity growth
and employment.  And that the economist’s task in this area is to illuminate
the existence of those social choices, and to distinguish clearly between
concepts and measures of absolute efficiency (which should always be
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2maximised) and measures which involve social choice, where trade-offs need
to be made, and should be made explicitly.
To make those points I would like to do four things:
1. To clarify measures, what are we trying to maximise and why, and which
measures imply social choice trade-offs, which not.
2. Against that clearer conceptual framework, to set out the facts of relative
performance according to different measures.
3. To suggest at least some of the explanations for the differences in
performance we observe.
4. To suggest some definite ‘so what’s’ for British policy, and some questions.
Equally, there are many issues of great and increasing relevance to productivity
trends and improvement which I will not cover – and in particular the complex issues
about how we measure productivity in services, and how we measure “investment” in a
world where much “economic” investment (such as software, training, brand building
and R&D) is in accounting terms expensed.  Those are vitally important issues which
threaten to reduce the validity of some of the analysis possible from conventional
measures of productivity, though not I think to undermine it entirely.
2. Clarifying Measures
Let's begin with the basic question - what are we trying to measure, what are we trying to
maximise?
Slide 2
One possible measure is output per hour worked - a measure on which the
‘continentalists’ (as I shall call them), are happy to focus, since on that basis France and
Germany do very well, well ahead of the UK, ahead of the US at the total economy level,
similar to the US for the market sector alone.  This is clearly not a silly measure - since
presumably we do want maximum output for minimum labour input, a maximum income
for minimum hours worked - not a bad measure it would seem therefore of absolute
efficiency, of prosperity, at any given point of time.  But it’s also clear that there are
problems with this measure, and the “Atlanticists” (as I will call the ultra-liberals) reply
with two objections - both somewhat valid, but both also more complex than the
Atlanticists suggest.
Objection one is simply that you can swell labour productivity per hour worked,
or per person employed, by having a low level of labour utilisation - a proposition
illustrated by some simple geometry.
3Slide 3
On the vertical axis output per unit of labour employed - on the horizontal, units of labour
ranked by declining order of productivity - a function presumably of their skill level.
Total output is equal to the area under the curve.
A country, which employs units of labour down to the very least productive, will
maximise this area under the curve and thus maximise GDP.
Slide 4
The country which cuts off the employment of the least productive labour - for instance
via a minimum wage, or trade union resistance to downward wage mobility, or other
forms of labour market inflexibility - will increase productivity per person employed or
per hour worked, but at the expense of total output and indeed of unemployment.  And
that, the Atlanticists will say, is precisely what France has done.
Slide 5
That France’s high productivity per hour worked looks less impressive once you get to
GDP per capita as a result of much lower hours worked per person, and of course there is
quite a lot in that.  France’s high productivity is to a degree at the expense of high
unemployment, though with a few important counter caveats.
First, that it is noticeable that even after these adjustments for hours worked,
France and Germany still do better than the UK in per capita income, which means that
their area under the curve is higher despite cutting off the tail of low skill low income
labour, so that their whole schedule must be at a superior level.  Second, that in assessing
the performance of a country with fewer hours worked but higher productivity per hour
worked, we must distinguish whether the non-working hours were unused voluntarily or
not.  By which I mean this:
Slide 6
That if you had a country which had the same involuntary level of unemployment as
another, but had through free choice selected a different trade-off between leisure and
income, whether via differences in, say, retirement ages, female participation rates, or
hours worked, then if that country had higher productivity per hour worked than the other
country it would in some absolute and meaningful sense be more productive, even if its
GDP per capita was lower.  Thus, provided the conditions in the left hand box of Slide 6
hold, GDP per capita of 96 can be better than GDP per capita of 100, if labour
productivity is higher.
Which is simply to say that GDP per capita is no more an absolutely and valid
measure of economic success than output per hour worked.  And that if we must avoid
the fallacy of lauding an economy which maximises output per hour at the expense of
involuntary unemployment, we should equally be wary of assuming that more labour
inputs are by definition good as long as they produce any marginal product.
For that would be a very odd proposition.  It would be a very odd proposition in
terms of economics - a positive desire to maximise inputs sitting ill with a science whose
usual focus is the maximisation of outputs and the minimisation of inputs.  And a strange
proposition in social terms, a relentless desire to maximise income, not balanced by any
sense of trade-off between leisure hours and income.  But it is a proposition to which
4some Atlanticists seem committed, when they point to France’s low hours worked per
person as by definition a form of economic failure.  Low hours per person are only a form
of economic failure if their unemployment is involuntary: if they are voluntarily not
worked, they represent simply a different social choice on the leisure versus income
trade-off.  The difference between French and American hours worked almost certainly
entails both a significant involuntary and a significant voluntary element.
So where are we?  Well, so far after the “continentalists” pitch on productivity per
hour, the “Atlanticists” counterattack and the “continentalists” counter caveats, we’ve
established that neither productivity per hour worked, nor productivity per person
employed, nor income per capita can be taken as an absolute measure of economic
success.
Slides 7, 8 & 9
But it feels like some mix of these, along with a look at the level of involuntary
unemployment is what we're after – output per hour worked as long as it’s not at the
expense of involuntary unemployment, and the proposition that although maximising
average labour productivity by cutting off the low end of the labour supply curve is not
superior, a higher labour productivity schedule is always better, ie for any given level of
labour input greater labour productivity is always preferable whether or not the tail is cut
off through labour market imperfections.
But the “Atlanticists” would not necessarily agree, for they have a second
objection to a focus on labour productivity.  Which says that even maximising the labour
productivity schedule is not necessarily optimal if it is achieved at the cost of unnecessary
capital inputs, ie that we cannot even assume that schedule A is better than schedule B,
independent of how much capital was used .
Slide 10
We need to look at capital productivity as well and then combine capital and labour
productivity into the ultimate measure, total factor productivity.  And indeed, if we look
at capital productivity it varies quite significantly between our four countries and as a
result if we compare their performance on a total factor productivity basis we get a
different relative ranking than when looking at labour productivity alone.
On this basis the US is the clear winner, and the UK is less far behind France and
Germany than previously supposed, but still well behind the US.  The US not the
Continent should therefore, it is argued, be the model.
So is this right?  Is capital productivity a relevant factor, and is total factor
productivity an inherently better measure of performance than labour productivity?  The
answer like most things in this debate is more of a mix of yes and no than polemicists on
either side like to pretend.
Clearly ceteris paribus, higher capital productivity is a good thing.  Capital
represents past investment, which represents past consumption foregone, and we want to
get as high a return as possible on any given amount of consumption foregone.
Slide 11
Looking at the capital productivity schedule which is analogous to the labour productivity
schedule, but now with units of capital on the horizontal axes, it must be the case that
5everything else being equal Schedule A is better than Schedule B.  And it is quite
possible that the US is on a higher schedule than France and Germany, that it gets a
higher return for any given amount of capital, because, for instance, it utilises its capital
assets more intensively rather than leaving them unused overnight or at weekends.
Slide 12
But it is also possible that the US has higher capital productivity, not because it’s on a
higher schedule but because it sets a higher cut-off point of investment return, increasing
capital productivity but possibly reducing labour productivity.  And of course that might
be an optimal thing to do.  For it must be the case that down in the right-hand corner of
the schedule you get at some point to an unattractively low return, but possible also that
very low return projects still go ahead if, for instance, you have public sector entities
making investments for prestige rather than return purposes, or private sector
management able to pursue prestige rather than return due to the absence of effective
shareholder control.  And again it is possible that some of that may have occurred in, for
instance, France, increasing attainable output and attainable labour productivity but at
such a cost in foregone consumption but it was not a rational economic choice nor the
investment level which individual French people would have selected if they had been
given the overt choice.
But equally it is also possible that US capital investment has been constrained
below a level which is in some sense optimal, for just as you can increase measured
labour productivity by not employing the less productive units of labour - for instance via
a minimum wage - so you can increase capital productivity by focusing on a small
number of high return projects.
Slides 13 & 14
For instance, if the free-market intersection of supply and demand curves for savings is at
a point representing a value of investment A, a government which successfully imposed a
tax on investment returns would reduce the level of capital investment - to B on this
chart.  It would as a result have a lower GDP per capita, lower labour productivity, but
higher capital productivity2.
The same result could be achieved if managers were excessively risk averse, or
applied arbitrarily high hurdle rates, because of taking a short term view, as in Will
Hutton’s attack on the Anglo-Saxon model.
So that stepping back, higher capital productivity in the US could be either the
result of better productivity for any given level of capital (ie a higher capital productivity
schedule) or a cut-off of the capital productivity schedule at what the continentalists
claim is a suboptimal point - investment too low to drive labour productivity to desirable
levels.
The problem is that there is no definitive way of deciding what the rational or best
point on the capital productivity schedule is.  Obviously there is some level of return on
investment which is so low that it would be a waste to pursue it, but as between say
                                        
2 Note: Strictly speaking the supply curve for savings intersects with the investment return schedule in any
one year, and the capital stock represented on this slide is the accumulation of multiple years of investment.
Slide 13 thus represents a simplified one period model.  The implications of the analysis hold however for a
multi period model.
6points A and B, there is no definitive best or worst but an issue of social choice.  If a
country selects B it will, everything else being equal, have higher capital productivity, but
lower labour productivity and lower GDP per capita.  If it selects A it will have lower
capital productivity but higher labour productivity and a higher GDP per capita.
You cannot get round this choice by claiming that one particular choice is either
irrational or unsustainable.  Which is what some Atlanticists try to do, implying either
that the French and German savers have as it were being tricked into higher levels of
savings or claiming that the choice of a lower return higher capital intensity combination
is in some sense “unsustainable” in the face of the globalisation.
But these are not valid implications.  For if it is true, as Will Hutton would assert,
that there exist German privately owned Middelstandt companies who are willing to go
on investing in their companies for lower returns than available to them in world capital
markets, because of non-monetary benefits, such as pride of company continuity and
growth, or a love of engineering excellence for its own sake, then Germany will ceteris
paribus have a higher capital intensity and higher labour productivity but lower capital
productivity, and there is nothing inherently unsustainable about that, no external force
that can make it unsustainable.  It may breakdown with changing social attitudes, but
there is no economic logic that says that it has to.
Finally, on the subject of capital productivity, it's worth distinguishing two
different comparisons we can make, a comparison of prosperity and a comparison of
efficiency.
Quite a lot of the higher labour productivity we see in France may indeed be due
to higher capital intensity, and that may in terms of absolute efficiency mean that the
French are not as far ahead of the UK as we suppose.  From an efficiency point of view
labour productivity is a highly imperfect measure, and capital has to be brought into the
picture.  But from a prosperity point of view, labour productivity must be the true
measure.  In the sense that if you were to ask which is the most prosperous and
productive country in 1999, the two relevant factors must be how much effort each
individual has to put in and what they get back as income, with past capital investment
irrelevant.
The fact that the French get greater income for much less work in 1999 may be
explained by the fact that they deferred more consumption in the 1960s and 1970s and
some of that savings may have been for relatively low return, but that explanation doesn't
change the fact that right now in 1999 they achieve a more productive income-to-effort
ratio.  The fact that Germany and France are more labour productive now because they
saved and invested more than the UK earlier, is an explanation not a denial of their
current prosperity advantage.
So capital productivity, like labour productivity, is important but riddled with as
many imperfections, and you don’t escape those imperfections by focusing on total factor
productivity.  Some commentators seem to think you do - they pull-out total factor
productivity with a sort of flourish - the real measure, the true measure of productivity -
inherently better than labour productivity and at last the thing we must maximise and no
doubt about it.
But I fear those who latch on to total factor productivity in that way simply don't
understand what it is.  It is a measure of relative productivity which asks how much of a
7total difference in output levels is explained by differences in labour or capital inputs,
with any remaining difference being the difference in total factor productivity.
Slides 15 & 16
Relative values can be calculated quite simply as a weighted average of labour and
capital productivities as here in last summer’s McKinsey report.  Which means that TFP
suffers from exactly the same deficiencies as labour and capital productivity.  Higher
labour productivity is not by definition good because you can increase it by simply not
employing your less skilled workers.  And higher capital productivity is not definitionally
good because you can increase it by only picking a small number of high return projects,
by applying an unreasonably high hurdle rate.
Slide 17
And total factor productivity which can be represented as here on the vertical axis, while
labour and capital form two horizontal axes – the schedule being a plane not a line - can
be increased by either minimising labour input or minimising capital input.
You can increase TFP by having a minimum wage which cuts off the employment
of low skill labour.  You can increase TFP by setting your hurdle rate high and
minimising capital investment.  TFP doesn’t rescue us from the conceptual problems of
labour productivity and capital productivity, it suffers from both simultaneously.
For any one given combination of labour and capital, higher TFP is always better,
the higher the plane the better, but that’s not the same as saying that a higher observed
level of TFP is definitionally better, since the level of TFP reflects choice of position on
the plane as well as the level of the plane.  So TFP, contrary to many commentators is not
a measure of absolute efficiency, though big differences in TFP do probably mean some
differences in absolute efficiency, and trends in TPF are likely to be correlated to trends
in absolute efficiency.  Which means that there is in fact no definitive maximand in all
this debate, and step one in thinking clearly is to realise that fact - rather than to alight on
the particular measure which happens to support one's ideological predilections.  There is
no absolute measure of success, and neither higher labour productivity, nor higher GDP
per capita, nor higher capital productivity, nor higher TFP are necessarily good.  And the
actually observable relativities of capital intensity and capital productivity, of labour
input and labour productivity, reflect not merely differences in absolute efficiency, but
social choices about the trade-off between present and future consumption, between
leisure and income.  We need to recognise that explicitly if we are to make valid
comparisons.
3. Comparing Productivity Levels
So much then for the theory, but what, with all due caveats, do the figures suggest about
the relative performance of the four countries?
Slide 18
Well, on a labour productivity per hour worked basis we have already seen the figures -
Germany and France the leaders on a whole economy basis, France slipping a little and
8the US rising when we look at market sector alone, the UK clearly behind on both
measures.
Slide 19
But with France and Germany making a very different social choice about number of
hours worked than the UK and the US, with the result that on a GDP per capita basis, the
US is the clear leader, and France and Germany only 5, 15 percent ahead of the UK in
prosperity.
Slide 20
And very different social choice too between France and Germany and the UK, and to a
degree the US, on capital intensity (Slide 20), with Germany and France providing for
each hour worked 30- 40 percent more capital investment than the UK, and 15 to 20
percent more than the US.  Although achieving with this greater capital investment a
much lower rate of capital productivity, either because of lower absolute efficiency, a
lower schedule, or because that extra capital involves taking on additional low return
project, going on down to the bottom right-hand corner of the capital productivity
schedule.
Slide 21
A complex picture of a different relative positioning on different measures, and one
which I think can be best undertook in terms of the following framework, which
distinguishes between the countries on three dimensions.
· In the top left hand box “Output for the same capital and labour” input, ie
absolute efficiency.
· In the middle box – capital intensity, a product of past prosperity and social
choice of the investment rate.
· At the bottom, of the investment rate labour input per capita, a product of
social choice.
The first two bullets combine to determine labour productivity.
Labour productivity and hours worked combining to produce GDP per capita
Slide 22
Comparing on this framework first US versus France and Germany, it seems highly likely
that the US is somewhat ahead in terms of absolute efficiency.  One cannot be definite on
this and we certainly cannot be definite on the magnitude of the US advantage, because
we have no macro measure of absolute efficiency.  Absolute efficiency is output achieved
for the same quantity of capital and labour and none of the measures we have looked at
measures that precisely.  Total factor productivity is the nearest measure, but as we have
seen is still not a precise measure of absolute efficiency.
But it is nevertheless a reasonable assumption that the US is ahead in absolute
efficiency, both because micro level case-by-case evidence suggests that, and because at
the macro level, as shown here, France and Germany achieve only a 6-9 percent labour
9productivity advantage despite 10-30 percent higher capital intensity, implying that they
are on lower capital productivity schedule than the US, not just a different more capital
intensive point.  The US absolute efficiency advantage may be quite small, perhaps only
5 and at most 10 percent, but it does appear to be there.
That higher absolute efficiency advantage is, however, offset by France and
Germany’s higher capital intensity, and capital intensity of course reflects two factors,
past prosperity, the past level of income out of which investment was saved, and social
choice - the rate of investment.  In this case of France and Germany's higher capital stock
reflects higher investment rates, since total income levels out of which to save have
always been somewhat lower than the US.
Finally, in the bottom box we bring in the other dimension of social choice, hours
worked.  The US deciding to work 30-40 percent more per person, translating to a
slightly lower 20-30 percent income advantage, given France and Germany’s 6-9 percent
labour productivity advantage at the total economy level.  In summary therefore, the US
is absolutely more efficient than France and Germany - but with France and Germany
choosing to invest more but work less.
Slide 23
Using the same framework to compare France and Germany versus the UK suggests the
following picture:
· The comparison of absolute efficiency unclear, though probably Germany and
France slightly ahead.
· The UK 30-50 percent behind in capital intensity, reflecting past prosperity
and investment rates.
· the UK therefore 20-30 percent behind in labour productivity, but offsetting
about half of that advantage by working 10-20 percent harder.
So similar absolute efficiency, more continental investment, more UK hours
worked.
Slide 24
And finally and most simply US versus the UK.
· The US undoubtedly ahead on absolute efficiency
· 20-30 percent more capital intensive
· Working 10 to 15 percent more hours per capita even than the British
· With a resulting GDP per capita advantage of 35-40 percent.
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4. Explanations of Difference
All of which suggests two key questions:
Slide 25
· Why is the US ahead of both Britain and France and Germany in absolute
efficiency?
· Why has Britain made different social choices than France or Germany in
respect to levels of investment and hours worked?
First then, why is the US ahead in absolute efficiency?  Well, part of the story is
simply historical.  The US was, for all sorts of reasons, well ahead of all European
countries in the 1950s, and it simply takes time to catch up.  Best practice transfer
mechanisms across the world, via ownership links, copying, consultants providing ideas,
bench marking, etc are in the long run powerful, but they take time.
Slide 26
And so part of the story is simply that Germany and France and the UK have been
catching up with the US, but they haven't got there yet.  (This slide shows total factor
productivity, and I repeat my caveat that TFP is not a perfect measure of absolute
efficiency, but it bears some relationship to absolute efficiency and its relative trends are
highly correlated to absolute efficiency.)
But it is also noticeable from this slide that the pace of catch-up for France and
Germany seems to have slowed down significantly or perhaps stalled completely.  And it
is therefore possible, and I suspect likely, that there will exist in the future a small US
absolute efficiency advantage - perhaps no more than 5 percent - which does not
disappear through the process of catch-up.
Why might that be?  Well I think the reasons are fairly obvious.  For the US has
two large and inherent advantages over the European economies which have a significant
impact on productivity.
Slide 27
The first is a very large single market.  A market of 270 million people speaking the same
language, with a more homogeneous culture than Europe, more homogeneous legal and
accounting and tax systems, and one currency.  And all those factors must imply lower
overheads and administrative costs, greater economies of scale in production and
marketing, and increased competitive intensity and contestability of markets, putting
greater pressure on management to improve performance.  It is probably impossible to
make any precise measure of the scale of productivity advantage resulting, but it is
difficult to imagine that it would fail to produce an advantage of several percentage
points.
Slide 28
The second inherent advantage is low population density, an economic factor which I
believe has received inadequate attention in productivity debates.  Lower population
density, means a lower cost of land, it means you can use more land more freely in
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manufacturing facility design, in retail outlets, in distribution centres.  And it means that
there is less public pressure against green field development, and less need for more
expensive and difficult brown field development.  And those facts are bound to have a
pervasive effect on absolute efficiency, on the output available from any given quantity
of capital and labour.  Retail and hotel operations which can be designed without space
constraints are inherently more efficient because of better physical layout.  Less physical
congestion in distribution - wider more open roads - allows larger manufacturing plants
and larger delivery volumes in larger trucks to larger retail stores, a key explanation,
along with a large homogeneous market, of O’Mahony and Mason’s finding that larger
batch size is a significant factor in superior US manufacturing productivity3.  Less
opposition to green field development makes it easier for new clusters of related
economic activity to develop.  And less opposition to green field development increases
further contestability of markets, for instance in the retail sector.
As with the large and homogeneous single market, it would be difficult or
impossible to measure the impact of these factors precisely, but difficult to imagine the
impact being less than several percentage points.  So that if we are looking for an
explanation of a US absolute efficiency advantage of perhaps 5-10 percent, I suspect the
answers are staring us in the face, the combination of a large homogeneous single market
and the lower population density highly likely to produce an inherent advantage of that
magnitude.
Slide 29
The difficult question is not why the advantages are there, but what to do about them, and
here we face two questions, whether it is possible to match the US advantage, and
whether it is desirable.  On the large homogeneous single market, the answer is surely
that it is desirable, as far as possible, for us to match the US advantages.  That means
completing the single market in Europe, removing remaining barriers to competition,
aiming for more harmonised accounting and legal rules, and perhaps entering the single
currency if we are convinced that the micro supply side benefits offset any macro risks.
But we must be realistic that however hard we try, barriers of language and culture will
still make the European single market less complete, less competitive and less amenable
to economies of scale than the US.
On the impact of low population density, the question is both is it possible and is
it desirable, as much a question of social choice as of economic efficiency.  By which I
mean this: we cannot make ourselves less densely populated, but we do make decisions
about how we face the inevitable economic cost of that density.
If we have a lax attitude to green field development, whether of roads, or of retail
stores, or of housing, we will get somewhat closer to replicating the conditions conducive
to high productivity and to the formation of business clusters we see in the US, though it
is unlikely that we would ever match them completely.  But we would do so at the
expense of an environmental impact which many would oppose.  That environmental
impact is usually thought of in qualitative terms, but it is a real cost which also
sometimes takes measurable economic form, a decline in housing values produced by a
nearby road development being a measure of that cost, and Nimbyism therefore not
                                        
3 Reference: Mason and O’Mahony’s (1997) NIESR Discussion Paper No.124
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irrational non-economic behaviour, but a perfectly rational economic motivation, an
attempt to protect value via political pressures in a context where property rights cannot
capture and are not compensated for the loss of environmental benefits and where
therefore a purely market based route to value maximisation is not available.
So we face a trade-off, and a social choice, and the job of the economist is to
illustrate social choice, not to deny it.  So that one possibility, faced with at least part of
the absolute efficiency advantage that the US enjoys, is simply to accept it as inherent.
Slide 30
This would not be catastrophic because:
· It does not mean accepting a lower rate of growth in productivity and
prosperity.
· It does not constrain the UK from catching up productivity at least to the
levels of the French and Germans, growing above the US rate of increase for
several years.
· It is not a constraint on employment creation, since productivity and
employment creation is two different challenges of economic policy, not the
same and not correlated.
· It would mean accepting a permanent US advantage in absolute efficiency of
perhaps five percent, perhaps a bit more, implying a similar advantage in GDP
per capita if all other factors are equal.
The role of the economist is to inform that choice with best estimates of
magnitude, but not to imply that there is no choice.
So much for the US comparison, the second question posed was why the UK had
made such different social choices than France and Germany in respect of investment
levels and hours worked.  And again it's important to start with an historical context, a
context of improving relative UK performance.
Slide 31
The UK's total factor productivity, after falling well behind French and German levels
between 1950 to 1980, has in fact caught up significantly in the past 15 years, reflecting a
closing of the absolute efficiency gap, with privatisation, better industrial relations, a
reborn will to manage, inward investment bringing better management practice, and the
impact of European single market competition, all increasing UK absolute efficiency.
Slides 32 & 33
There’s an important historical pattern too in relation to capital intensity with, for
instance, Germany's relative capital intensity advantage being the product of higher
investment levels in the 1950s, 60s and 70s, and with that advantage now constant or
even slightly falling, since UK business investment as a percentage of GDP is now
slightly higher than either French or German - though government investment is still
lower.  So that the causes of higher French and German investment, the differences in
social choice, now in a sense lie in the past.
But it is still important to analyse why that difference occurred, not only as an
exercise of economic history, but because the UK rate of investment still remains
13
inadequate to close the capital intensity and productivity gap.  For if the UK simply
invests at the same rate as France, Germany and the US, the capital stock gap, while not
growing in percentage terms, will simply stay stable.  We need to invest a higher
percentage of GDP to close the gap.  And if all other factors are equal the free-market
equilibrium ought to produce that higher investment.  Because if skills, financial market
behaviour, and managerial attitudes are similar, and if there are efficient mechanisms for
the transfer of both best practice and capital, a country with a currently lower
productivity rate ought to attract a higher level of investment since the opportunities for
high return on investment should be greatest in that country.  We are beginning to see
that effect, but it needs to go further if we are to close the gap, so it’s important to
understand why the historical difference and why the recent more favourable trend.
So why has the UK had a lower tendency to invest than the Continent?  And why
indeed, a perhaps related question, has it chosen or ended up with higher hours worked?
Well, the answers are multi-faceted and disputed, and I cannot in this paper attempt any
proof of a particular theory.  But let me at least set out one story which appears to fit both
macro figures and micro level anecdote.  A story which involves complex cycles of self
reinforcing factors, both in the arena of macro-economic and financial influences, and in
respect to labour and capital factor costs and incentives.
Slide 34
In the macro and financial arena, it seems clear that for much of the post-war period, the
UK macro economy was simply more volatile than major continental competitors, with
more volatile rates of inflation and growth.  And that volatility seems to have been both a
cause and effect in a cycle which involved more risk averse short-termist behaviour,
lower investment, lower growth, and higher inflation and volatile exchange rates as a
result.
Certainly it was the perception of many in British business until the last five years
or so, that they were subject to such macro-economic uncertainty - booms and busts - that
short-termism was a perfect logical reaction.
Slide 35
As for what the basic causes of that cycle were, the exogenous rather than dependent
variables, accounts differ.  Will Hutton would argue that the relationships between
finance and management created a short-termist culture independent of macro volatility,
and that this was the exogenous variable.  Others would focus on the issues of labour and
capital cost and quality to which I will turn in a minute.  Some to our late entry to the
Common market, failing to create competitive pressure for change and investment in the
1950s and 1960s, some to poor management and poor industrial relations, others simply
to poor macro-economic policy.
I am not going to attempt in this paper to judge between those competing
explanations of the independent variables, but suggest instead that whatever the initial
cause it was the cyclical reinforcement of these factors which was crucial.
Slides 36 & 37
Those macro and financial factors then interlocked, I suggest, with characteristics of the
labour and capital markets which made continental economies both more capital
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intensive and less labour-intensive than the UK's.  From the macro and financial factors
already considered, and from higher skills, came higher continental productivity and
higher real wages, and those then combined with two other forces to make continental
decisions on capital versus labour substitution quite different from those we saw in the
UK.
· One of those factors was continental tax systems which have been strongly
favourable to capital investment and strongly unfavourable to the employment
of labour.
· The other was labour market inflexibility - minimum wages set high,
significant trade union power, restraints on firing labour which made
management averse to hiring it - different inflexibilities in different countries -
but all tending to create a strong management preference for capital
investment rather than labour input, creating higher investment and higher
productivity but also lower employment, both in terms of lower hours worked
and higher unemployment.
That picture fits both the macro facts and the micro level anecdotes.  Ask any UK
car manufacturer with plants also in Germany, why productivity per hour worked in the
UK is lower and you will usually get two responses - low skills and lower capital
investment.  Ask why this same company has invested less in its British than in its
German plants, and part of the answer will typically be that higher German wages and the
danger of high exit costs from employment mean that the investment case for labour
minimising investment usually looks better in the German plant.
Ask a multinational company with numerous product lines which they
manufacture in the UK and which on the Continent, and the pattern is often explained by
this cycle and contributes to this cycle - long batch run, higher volume lines in highly
automated continental plants, shorter runs and products requiring more frequent line
changes and more labour input in less capital intensive UK plants.  Which of course
suggests that the continental model has downsides, that its higher productivity may well
have been at the inevitable cost of higher unemployment, with the social choice of lower
German and French hours worked part involuntary as well as part voluntary.  An example
again of the trade-offs involved in this area of policy, and raising some complex
questions about optimal policy, questions however which I will have to leave for another
day.
5. So What’s and Open Questions
My aim has been to explore some of the complexities involved in this debate on
productivity, and to illustrate that the choice of optimal policy cannot assume either one
self-evidently correct maximand, nor a sole path to achieve that objective.  We are not
just dealing with absolute efficiency but with social choice.




The essence of those models, compared to the UK, can be captured by using figures again
taken from O’Mahony.
· Germany on these figures is 27 percent more productive than the UK,
primarily because of superior skills and greater capital investment, but to a
much smaller extent because of an absolute efficiency advantage - the residual
in this calculation.
· The US is 21 percent more productive, and here the key causes is not capital
nor skills, but the residual, ie absolute efficiency.
Slightly different figures to those we saw earlier but telling the same basic story -
the US ahead in absolute efficiency; the continent investing more in capital and in skills
(though I have not investigated that skills issue in this paper).
I have suggested some of the reasons for that higher absolute efficiency in the US,
and for higher capital investment on the Continent.
Slide 39
The analysis suggests some common and agreed measures to enhance UK productivity
but also some choices.
· It implies that measures to make the European single market as complete and
deep as possible, and measures to make product markets as competitive as
possible, will help to narrow (though not eliminate), the absolute efficiency
gap between the UK and US (and indeed between the Continent and the US).
· The figures show that increased capital investment is essential to closing the
productivity gaps, and the vital importance therefore of macro-economic
stability and of government capital investment.
But beyond that common core the analysis suggests some trade-offs and choices.
· The continental model implying still higher capital investment and skills
investment, but raising questions about whether any levers to encourage
capital investment exist in a global market, and about whether and how the
Continental high investment model can be made compatible with full
employment.
· Or the US model implying physical deregulation - easier planning rules - but
with questions about how much of the gap we could close via that route and
whether it is desirable.
Both choices can be informed by economic analysis but they are choices, and
choices which should be debated, not hidden by the assumption that there is one correct
measure of economic success or one correct route to achieve it.
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• Productivity per hour 120
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Ù Weights reflect labour + capital share of value
added/income : average for four countries
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Labour & Capital Productivity
Increased at Expense of Output
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TFP - A Declining Function of
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US versus Germany & France
Social choice
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Germany & France versus UK
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Key Questions:
¨ Why is the US ahead in absolute
efficiency?
¨ Why has Britain made different
social choices than France &
Germany?








1950 1960 1973 1979 1989 1995
US = 100
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Inherent US Advantage -
Lower population density
Less constrained hotel &
retail space
Larger manufacturing
plants & economies of scale
Less congestion costs in
physical distribution
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¨ Can we match
the US?
¨ Would it be
desirable?
¨ Or should we
accept as
inherent?
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An Inherent US advantage?
¨ Not a higher rate of growth
¨ Not a constraint on further UK catch-up
¨ Not a constraint on employment creation
¨ But a permanent advantage of say 5% (?) if all
other factors equal?
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 Higher hurdle rates
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Higher Continental Investment -
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Sources of labour productivity
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